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Abstract Malware authors introduced obfuscation tech-
niques to existing malware in order to evade detection
and hide its purposes. As a result, the number of ma-
licious programs has grown in both volume and so-
phistication. Thus, effective categorization of malware
based on its characteristics and behavior is required.
In this paper, malicious software is visualized as gray
scale images since its ability to capture minor changes
while retaining the global structure helps to detect vari-
ations. Motivated by the visual similarity between mal-
ware samples of the same family, we propose a file ag-
nostic deep learning approach for malware categoriza-
tion to efficiently group malicious software into fami-
lies based on a set of discriminant patterns extracted
from their visualization as images. The suitability of
our approach is evaluated against two benchmarks: the
MalImg dataset and the BigData Innovators Gather-
ing. Experimental comparison demonstrates its supe-
rior performance with respect to state-of-the-art tech-
niques.
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1 Introduction
Malware, short for malicious software, refers to software
programs designed to perform any kind of unwanted
or harmful action on a computer system. Malware can
be divided into the following categories, not mutually
exclusive, depending on their purpose:
– Adware. It is designed to automatically render ad-
vertisements. Advertising-supported software often
comes bundled with software and applications and
serves as a revenue tool.
– Spyware. It spies and gathers user information with-
out their knowledge and permission. Spyware pro-
grams are used to record keystrokes, to harvest fi-
nancial data or monitoring user activity.
– Virus. It is capable of reproducing itself and spread-
ing to other computer systems.
– Worm. It exploits vulnerabilities of the operation
system to spread. The major difference between worms
and viruses is the ability of worms to independently
self-replicate and spread while viruses depend on hu-
man activity.
– Trojan. It disguises itself as a benign program to
deceive users.
– Rootkit. It is designed to enable remotely access to
a computer or its software without permission.
– Backdoor. It is designed to bypass system’s security
mechanisms.
– Ransomware. It essentially restricts user access to
the computer by encrypting the files or locking down
the system while demanding a ransom.
– Bot. They are created to automatically perform spe-
cific operations such as DDoS attacks or malware
distribution.
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Moreover, malicious software can be grouped to-
gether into families depending on their behavior and
capabilities and, consequently, these shared character-
istics between samples belonging to the same family
might be used for detection and classification of unseen
programs.
According to McAfee [15] more than 600 million
types of malware were detected during the first quarter
of 2017. The proliferation of malicious software has in-
creased quickly thanks to the utilization of polymorphic
and metamorphic techniques used to evade detection
and hide its malicious purpose. On the one hand, poly-
morphic malware uses a polymorphic engine to mutate
the code while keeping the original functionality intact.
Packing and encryption are the two most common ways
to hide code. On the other hand, metamorphic mal-
ware rewrites its code every time it is propagated to an
equivalent one. Traditionally, antivirus solutions relied
on signature-based and heuristic-based methods. A sig-
nature is an algorithm or hash that uniquely identifies a
specific malware. Heuristics is a set of rules determined
by experts after analyzing the behavior of malware. The
main drawback of both approaches is that the malware
has to be analyzed prior to the creation of these rules
and heuristics. Broadly speaking, there are two kind of
approaches: static analysis and dynamic analysis.
Static analysis consists of examining the code or
structure of a program without executing it. This kind
of analysis can confirm whether a file is malicious, pro-
vide information about its functionality and can also be
used to produce a simple set of signatures. The most
common static analysis approaches are:
– Finding sequences of characters or strings. Search-
ing through the strings of a program is the most sim-
ple way to obtain hints about its functionality. For
instance, you can find strings related to printed mes-
sages, URLs to which the program accesses, the lo-
cation of files modified by the executable and names
of common Windows dynamic link libraries (DLLs).
– Analysis of the Portable Executable File Format.
The Portable Executable(PE) file format is used
by Windows executables, object code and DLLs.
Among the information it includes, the most use-
ful pieces of information are the linked libraries and
functions as well as the metadata about the file in-
cluded in the headers.
– Searching for packed/encrypted code. Malware writ-
ers usually use packing and encryption to make their
files more difficult to analyze. Software programs
that have been packed or encrypted usually contain
very few strings and higher entropy compared to
legitimate programs.
– Disassembling the program, i.e. recovering the sym-
bolic representation from the machine code instruc-
tions.
Dynamic analysis involves executing the program
and monitoring its behavior on the system. Unlike static
analysis, dynamic analysis allows to observe the actual
actions executed by the a program. It is typically per-
formed when static analysis has reached a dead end,
either due to obfuscation and packing, or by having
exhausted the available static analysis techniques. A
survey on automated dynamic analysis techniques and
tools is found in M. Egele et al [6]. Some techniques are:
– Function Call Monitoring. The behavior of the pro-
gram is analyzed by using the traces containing the
sequence of functions invoked by the executable un-
der analysis.
– Function Parameter Analysis. Consists of tracking
the values of parameters and function return values.
– Information Flow Tracking. Analyze how a program
processes data and how data is propagated through
the system.
– Instruction Trace. Analysis of the complete sequence
of machine instructions executed by the program.
However, both static and dynamic analysis tech-
niques have their own drawbacks. Static analysis is faster
but suffers from code obfuscation, techniques used by
malware authors to conceal the malicious purpose of the
program. Dynamic analysis does not need to unpack or
decrypt the executable but is more resource-consuming.
Additionally, both approaches require past detection of
the malware to generate signatures. Unfortunately, such
systems fail to predict new unseen malware and it is
unfeasible to analyze manually every sample received.
Thus, techniques to automatically categorize malware
are required.
Recently, machine learning techniques have been em-
ployed as a solution against malware. The success of
these approaches has increased thanks to: (1) the rise of
commercial feeds of malware; (2) the reduction in cost
of computing power; and (3) the advances made in the
machine learning field. Several methods have been ap-
plied based on features extracted from both static and
dynamic analysis. A review of the most common fea-
tures used by machine learning techniques is presented
in Section 2.
Based on the work of Nataraj et al. [19], in this
paper we present a file agnostic deep learning system
to classify malware into families based on the repre-
sentation of their binary content as gray-scale images.
Our work is based on the observation that samples of
the same family appear to be visually similar while dis-
tinct from samples of other families. To demonstrate
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the suitability of our novel approach we make use of two
publicly available datasets, one containing 9458 samples
of 25 different malware families and a second contain-
ing 10868 samples of 9 different families. Experiments
show that our method is capable of classifying samples
from both datasets with 98.48% and 97.49% of accu-
racy, respectively, outperforming state-of-the-art meth-
ods in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section
2 discusses the related research. Section 3 describes the
insights from representing malicious software as gray
scale images. Section 4 introduces our deep learning
approach for malware classification. Section 5 evaluates
the performance of our method. Finally, Section 6 con-
cludes with our remarks and future work suggestions.
2 Related Work
The use of machine learning algorithms to address the
problem of malicious software detection and classifica-
tion has increased during the last decade. An overview
is provided in [22,7]. Instead of directly digesting raw
malware, machine learning solutions first extract fea-
tures that provide an abstract view of the software pro-
gram. Then the features extracted are used to train the
model. The type of features can be broadly divided into
two groups just like the types of malware analysis.
Static features are those extracted from the binary
of the malware without executing it. One of the most
common types of features is byte n-grams. An n-gram is
a contiguous sequence of n items from a given sequence
of text. In the work of Tesauro et al. [28] they extracted
a list of byte-sequence trigrams and used an artificial
neural network to classify malware. Similar to byte-
sequence n-grams, approaches in the literature have
used opcodes n-grams [24,4]. An opcode (abbreviated
from operation code) is the portion of machine language
instruction that specifies the operation to be performed.
In particular, D. Yuxin et al. [29] used deep belief net-
works as a feature extractor to generate deep features
to represent executables from their opcodes sequences.
Features can also be extracted from the Portable Exe-
cutable (PE) Header. The PE Header contains informa-
tion about the files themselves such as the associated
dynamically linked libraries and the sections of the pro-
gram and their sizes. For instance, Ravi and Manoharan
et al. [5] proposed a malware detection system based on
Windows API call sequences. In addition, entropy has
proven to be an effective feature to detect malware. The
entropy of a program, refers to the amount of disorder
(uncertainty) or its statistical variation. Entropy has
commonly been used to detect encrypted and packed
executables because these programs often have higher
entropy. For example, in the dataset studied by Lydia
et al. [16], native executables had an average entropy of
5.099 while packed and encrypted executables had an
average entropy of 6.801, 7.175, respectively. Moreover,
Bat-Erdene et al. [3] used entropy analysis to classify
packing algorithms of given unknown packed executa-
bles.
Furthermore, dynamic features are those extracted
by executing and observing the behavior of malware.
Malware API calls have been used to model the be-
havior of malware. In [23], Z. Salehi et al. constructed
dynamic features based on the name of API calls and
each argument and return value recorded in a controlled
environment during runtime. M. Ghiasi et al. [8] pre-
sented a framework for malware detection based on
the changes in register contents. In [27], C.Storlie et
al. presented a spine logistic regression model for mal-
ware detection, trained on the instruction traces ex-
tracted dynamically from computer programs. Addi-
tionally, B.Anderson [2] constructed graphs from the
instruction traces of executables and applied graph ker-
nels to create and compare similarity matrices of differ-
ent computer programs.
Besides, several visualization techniques have been
proposed in the literature to help malware analysis.
Nataraj et al. [19] used image processing techniques
to classify malware according to its visualization as
grayscale images. Their method represented a binary
file as a grayscale image by converting each bit value
into an image pixel. Han et al. [9] converted the images
into entropy graphs. Their system used the bitmap im-
age to calculate the entropy value of each line and gen-
erate an entropy graph. Lastly, Sorokin et al. [25] visual-
ized a given executable using its structural entropy, ob-
tained by dividing a binary into non-overlapping chunks
and computing the entropy for each chunk.
3 Malware Visualization
Our approach is motivated by the results of the exper-
iments of Nataraj et al.[19]. Their work is based on the
observation that images of malware samples from the
same family appear to be similar while distinct from
samples belonging to different families.
3.1 Visualizing Malware as an Image
To visualize a malware sample as an image, every byte
has to be interpreted as one pixel in an image. Then, the
resulting array has to be organized as a 2-D array and
visualized as a gray scale image. In our work, we tried
to keep an aspect ratio of 3:2. Note that the resulting
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gray-scale images will have distinct widths and heights
because the size of each sample is different. Values are
in the range [0,255] (0:black, 255:white).
Fig. 1 shows the representation of samples of mal-
ware belonging to nine different families as gray-scale
images. It can be observed that images of software ex-
ecutables from a given family are similar visually while
distinct from those belonging to a different family. The
main benefit of visualizing a malicious executable as
an image is that the different sections of a binary can
be easily differentiated. In addition, malware authors
only used to change a small part of the code to produce
new variants. Thus, if old malware is re-used to create
new binaries the resulting ones would be very similar.
Additionally, by representing malware as an image it
is possible to detect the small changes while retaining
the global structure of samples belonging to the same
family.
Fig. 1: Gray-scale images of malicious software belong-
ing to various families. Note that the images of malware
belonging to the same family are similar while distinct
from the images of malware from the rest of families.
In most cases, when observed in detail, one can
notice several sections in the program, which usually
have distinct feature patterns. Furthermore, the im-
ages stored in the resources section (.rsrc) of the PE
file are also displayed (See Fig. 2). In addition, with
this kind of representation you can detect where zero-
padding has been applied. Zero-padding is mainly used
for block alignment but malware authors also use it to
reduce the overall entropy of an executable.
Fig. 2: Gray-scale image representation of a malware
sample containing a logo on their resources section
3.2 Texture Analysis and Feature Extraction
Traditional recognition approaches are composed of two
stages: (1) feature extraction, transforming an observed
signal into a robust representation, and (2) classifica-
tion to model decision-making. Consequently, their per-
formance relies heavily on the discriminative power of
the features extracted. Image-based hand-designed fea-
ture extractors in the literature [19,1,18] gather rele-
vant information about an input and eliminate irrele-
vant variabilities. In summary, Nataraj et al. [19] and
Narayanan et al. [18] extracted GIST and PCA fea-
tures, respectively, and Ahmadi et al. [1] extracted both
Haralick and local binary pattern features. Below is a
brief description of the aforesaid methods.
GIST descriptors [21]. Given an image, the process
to compute a GIST descriptor is as follows. First, the
image is convolved with 32 Gabor filters with 8 orienta-
tions and 4 scales. Second, each feature map is divided
into 16 regions of 4x4 values, and then the feature values
are averaged within each region. Last, the 16 averaged
values of all feature maps are concatenated.
PCA [11] features. Principal Component Analysis
is a statistical procedure used for dimensionality reduc-
tion. It uses an orthogonal transformation to convert
a set of observations of n possible correlated variables
into a set of values with m linearly uncorrelated vari-
ables named principal components, where n ≤ m.
Haralick [10] features. Haralick features have been
used for image classification for years. The features are
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calculated by constructing a co-occurrence matrix. Then,
they are computed by using the equations defined by
Haralick such as the angular second-moment, contrast,
correlation, etc.
Local binary pattern [20] features. The local bi-
nary pattern (LBP) feature of a given pixel is computed
as follows. First, an 8 bit binary array is initialized as
0. Then, each pixel is compared with its neighboring
pixels in clockwise direction. If the value of the neigh-
boring pixel is greater or equal 1 is assigned to its corre-
sponding position. This gives an 8 bit binary array with
zeros and ones. The 8-bit binary pattern is converted
to a decimal number and is stored in the corresponding
pixel location in the LBP mask. This process is applied
to all pixels in an image. Once all LBP values have
been calculated, the mask is normalized, resulting in
256 features.
Following recent advances in the machine learning
community, we propose a system that automatically ex-
tracts local and invariant features with convolutional
neural networks. Experiments in Section 5 demonstrate
its superior performance in comparison to the afore-
mentioned methods.
4 Convolutional Neural Networks for Malware
Classification
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) [14] are a type
of artificial neural network biologically inspired by the
mammals visual cortex [12], whose receptive field com-
prises sub-regions layered over each other to cover the
entire visual field. This type of networks has long been
used in visual recognition tasks such as image classi-
fication or object detection due to its ability to auto-
matically extract discriminant and local features from
images.
The core of a convolutional neural network consists
of one or more convolutional layers and one or more
fully connected layers. In particular, convolutional lay-
ers act as detection filters for the presence of specific
features or patterns present in the data. The first layers
detect lower level features whereas later layers detect
increasingly high level features. On the contrary, fully
connected layers are used at the end of a CNN to com-
bine all the specific features detected by the previous
layers and determine a specific target output. Figure 3
presents an overview of our CNN architecture.
The input of the network is an executable repre-
sented as a grayscale image xw,h,d, where w and h are
the width and the height of the image, respectively,
and d is the depth (d = 1). Following the input layer
are three 4-stage feature extractors which learn hierar-
chical features through convolution, activation, pooling
and normalization layers.
1. Convolution. Convolution is a mathematical op-
eration that takes an input signal of size w × h× d
and a filter of size k × k × d, where k ≤ w, h, and
produces one output signal. The kernel slides over
each value of the input signal, multiplies the corre-
sponding entries of the input signal and the kernel
and adds them up. Figure 4 presents three of the
filters learned in the first convolutional layer. It can
be observed that the features these kernels detect
are high changes in the pixels intensities. In partic-
ular, the convolutional layers are composed of 50,
70 and 70 filters of size 5x5x1, 3x3x50 and 3x3x70
for the first, second and third convolutional layers,
respectively.
2. Activation function. The activation function is
used to signal distinct identification of likely fea-
tures. Specifically, we used the ReLU [17] non-linear
function y(x) = max(x, 0) in all activation layers.
3. Pooling. The pooling operation reduces the spatial
size of the features and provides some sort of ro-
bustness against noise and distortion. We applied
max-pooling with filters of size 2x2x1 with stride
1, which reduces the input signal by half, i.e. if the
input signal’s size is 128x128x1, the output of apply-
ing max-pooling is an output signal of size 64x64x1.
4. Normalization. The input values for different neu-
rons in the layer are normalized using local response
normalization [13] to inhibit and boost the neurons
with relatively larger activations.
At the end of the extractor, the feature maps are flat-
tened and combined to be used as input of the follow-
ing feed-forward layer composed of 256 neurons. Lastly,
the output of the aforementioned layer passes to a soft-
max layer to classify the binary program into its corre-
sponding family. In addition to normalization, to pre-
vent overfitting we employed dropout [26], a regular-
ization mechanism which randomly drops a proportion
of p units during forward propagation and prevents the
co-adaptation between neurons.
5 Evaluation
This section presents an empirical evaluation of the re-
sults obtained by our method in two datasets: (1) the
MalImg dataset [19]; (2) the dataset provided by Mi-
crosoft for the Big Data Innovators Gathering Anti-
Malware Prediction Challenge.
6 Daniel Gibert et al.
Fig. 3: Convolutional neural network for classification of malware represented as gray-scale images. It is composed
by 3 convolutional layers followed by one fully-connected layer. The input of the network is a malicious program
represented as a gray-scale image. The output of the network is the predicted class of the malware sample.
Fig. 4: Images of 3 filters randomly selected from the
first convolutional layer
5.1 Experimental Setup
The experiments were run on a single computer with
the following hardware specifications:
– CPU: Intel i7-7700K
– Memory: 32 GB RAM
– GPU: Nvidia GTX 1080 Ti
To estimate the generalization performance of our ap-
proach we used K-fold cross validation. The dataset is
divided into K equal size folds. Of the K subsamples, a
single subsample is retained as the validation data for
testing the model and the remaining subsamples are
used as training data. This procedure is repeated as
many times as there are folds, with each of the K folds
used exactly once as the validation data.
Furthermore, to select the best model, additional
evaluation metrics have been used: precision, recall and
F1 score. This is because accuracy can be a mislead-
ing measure. Sometimes it may be desirable to select
a model with a lower accuracy but with a greater pre-
dictive power on the problem (aka. accuracy paradox).
This occurs when there is as large class imbalance, where
a model can predict the value of the value of the major-
ity class for all predictions and achieve a high classifi-
cation accuracy while making mistakes on the minority
or critical classes.
Precision (P ) is defined as the number of true pos-
itives (Tp) over the number of true positives plus the
number of false positives (Fp).
P =
Tp
Tp + Fp
Recall (R) is defined as the number of true positives
(Tp) over the number of true positives plus the number
of false negatives (Fn).
P =
Tp
Tp + Fn
The F1 score is the weighted average of precision, de-
fined as following:
F1 = 2 · P ·R
P + R
Since our target task is a multi-class classification prob-
lem, we used an adapted version of the score named
macro-averaged F1 score, defined as the average of the
individual F1 scores obtained for each class.
macro F1 =
1
q
q∑
i=1
F i1
where q is the number of classes in the dataset and F i1
is the F1 score of class i. Macroaveraging gives equal
weight to each class. Thus, large classes will not domi-
nate over small classes.
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5.2 MalImg dataset
The MalImg dataset was provided by Nataraj et al.
[19] and consists of 9342 gray scale images of 25 mal-
ware families. It contains samples of malicious soft-
ware packed with UPX from different families such as
Yuner.A, VB.AT, Malex.gen!J, Autorun.K and Rbot!gen.
Additionally, there are images of family variants like the
C2Lop.p and the C2Lop.gen!g or the Swizzor.gen!I and
the Swizzor.gen!E. For more details, see Table 1.
Table 1: MalImg: Distribution of Samples
Family Class ID #samples
Adialer.C 1 125
Agent.FYI 2 116
Allaple.A 3 2949
Allaple.L 4 1591
Allueron.gen!J 5 198
Autorun.K 6 106
C2Lop.P 7 146
C2Lop.gen!g 8 200
Dialplatform.B 9 177
Dontovo.A 10 162
Fakerean 11 381
Instantaccess 12 431
Lolyda.AA1 13 213
Lolyda.AA2 14 184
Lolyda.AA3 15 123
Lolyda.AT 16 159
Malex.gen!J 17 136
Obfuscator.AD 18 142
Rbot!gen 19 158
Skintrim.N 20 80
Swizzor.gen!E 21 128
Swizzor.gen!I 22 132
VB.AT 23 408
Wintrim.BX 24 97
Yuner.A 25 800
5.2.1 Results
In order to train the network we downsampled the im-
ages to a fixed size. The width and height of the new
images were set to 256. A lower value did not retain all
the important information (i.e. lost discriminative in-
formation about a family) while higher values only in-
creased the computational time without increasing the
overall accuracy. For instance, if images were downsam-
pled to 28x28 pixels, samples from the Yuner.A and
the Autorun.K families became indistinguishable from
one another and the model failed to classify correctly
any sample belonging to the Autorun.K family. On the
contrary, if images were downsampled to 128x128 pix-
els, the model classified correctly 42.45% of samples
belonging to the Autorun.K family. Finally, if images
are downsampled to 256x256 pixels, the percentage of
(a) Autorun.K (b) Yuner.A
Fig. 5: Autorun.K and Yuner.A samples downsampled
to 256x256 pixels. The left image corresponds to the
gray-scale visualization of a malware sample belonging
to the Autorun.K family while the image in the right
belongs to the Yuner.A family. Notice that both images
are indistinguishable by the human eye.
correctly classified samples belonging to the Autorun.K
family increased to 80.02%. In consequence, the macro-
averaged F1 score increased from 0.948 to 0.958. See
Table 2 and Table 3 for more information.
The overall classification accuracy achieved by our
method for the 25 malware families is higher than the
approach of Nataraj et al., 0.9848 and 0.9718, respec-
tively. As can be observed in Table 3, there were two
major sources of misclassifications. On the one hand,
the model classified incorrectly 21 samples of the Au-
torun.K family as belonging to the Yuner. That is be-
cause both families are compressed with UPX and their
corresponding executables visualized as gray scale im-
ages only differ in the .rsrc section. As can be seen in
Fig. 5, samples from the Autorun.K and Yuner.A fam-
ilies are indistinguishable to the human eye. On the
other hand, the model had problems classifying samples
belonging to variants of the same family, such as Swiz-
zer.gen!E and Swizzer.gen!I. In particular, it only clas-
sified correctly 71% and 62% of their samples. If family
variants are combined as one, the overall accuracy and
F1 score is increased to 0.993 and 0.984, respectively.
Specifically, the following families were grouped in one.
– Allaple.A and Allaple.L as Allaple.
– C2Lop.P and C2Lop.gen!g as C2Lop.
– Lolyda.AA1, Lolyda.AA2, Lolyda.AA3 and Lolyda.AT
as Lolyda.
– Swizzor.gen!E and Swizzor.gen!I as Swizzor.
As observed in Table 4, by grouping the samples of
family variants into a single family, the number of sam-
ples incorrectly classified was reduced. In particular,
the samples misclassified belonging to variants of the
Swizzor family was reduced from 87 to 26.
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Table 2: MalIMG dataset confusion matrix for 10-fold cross validation using images of 128x128 pixels
Family 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Precision Recall F1 Score
1 122 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
2 0 116 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
3 0 0 2949 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 0.99 0.99
4 0 0 0 1591 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
5 0 0 0 0 198 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 0.99 0.99
6 0 0 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 61 0.42 1.0 0.59
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 131 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 0.94 0.90 0.92
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 191 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0.96 0.93 0.95
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 177 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 162 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 380 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 431 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 213 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 0.99 0.99
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 181 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.98 0.99 0.99
15 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0.98 1.0 0.99
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 158 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.99 1.0 0.99
17 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 134 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.99 0.99 0.99
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 156 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.99 1.0 0.99
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 86 38 0 0 0 0.67 0.72 0.69
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 92 0 0 0 0.69 0.67 0.68
23 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 405 0 0 0.99 0.99 0.99
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 97 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 800 1.0 0.93 0.96
Macro-averaged F1 Score = 0,948
Table 3: MalIMG dataset confusion matrix for 10-fold cross validation using images of 256x256 pixels
Family 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Precision Recall F1 Score
1 122 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
2 0 116 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
3 0 0 2949 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 0.99 0.99
4 0 0 0 1591 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
5 0 0 0 0 198 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 0.99 0.99
6 0 0 0 0 0 85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 0.80 1.0 0.89
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 138 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0.95 0.87 0.88
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 192 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0.96 0.94 0.95
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 177 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 162 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
11 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 376 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.99 1.0 0.99
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 431 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 213 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 0.99 0.99
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 181 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.98 0.99 0.98
15 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 121 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.98 1.0 0.99
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 157 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.99 1.0 0.99
17 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 134 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.99 0.99 0.99
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 157 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.99 1.0 0.99
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 91 31 0 0 0 0.71 0.71 0.71
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 82 1 0 1 0.62 0.71 0.66
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 406 0 0 0.99 0.99 0.99
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 97 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 800 1.0 0.97 0.98
Macro-averaged F1 Score = 0.958
Table 4: MalIMG dataset confusion matrix for 10-fold cross validation using images of 256x256 pixels with family
variants grouped into a single family. 1:Adialer.C; 2:Agent.FYI, 3:Allaple.A, Allaple.L; 4:Allueron.gen!J; 5:Au-
torun.K; 6:C2Lop.P, C2Lop.gen!g; 7:Dialplatform.B; 8:Dontovo.A; 9:Fakerean; 10:Instantaccess; 11:Lolyda,AA1;
Lolyda.AA2; Lolyda.AA3, Lolyda.AT, 12:Malex.gen!J; 13:Obfuscator.AD; 14:Rbot!gen; 15:Skintrim.N; 16:Swiz-
zor.gen!E, Swizzor.gen!I; 17:VB.AT; 18:Wintrim.BX; 19:Yuner.A
Family 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Precision Recall F1 Score
1 122 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
2 0 116 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 0.99 0.99
3 0 0 4540 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 0.99 0.99
4 0 0 0 198 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 0.99 0.99
5 0 0 0 0 98 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0,92 1.0 0.96
6 0 0 0 0 0 330 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 0.95 0.92 0.93
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 177 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 162 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 0.99 0.99
9 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 377 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.99 1.0 0.99
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 431 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
11 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 676 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.99 0.99 0.99
12 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 133 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.98 0.99 0.98
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 142 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 158 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
16 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 234 1 0 0 0.90 0.99 0.94
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 405 0 0 0.99 0.96 0.97
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 97 0 1.0 1.0 1.0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 800 1.0 0.99 0.99
Macro-averaged F1 Score = 0.984
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The main advantage of our approach with respect
to the method of Ahmadi et al. is two fold. First, our
classification time is not constrained by the size of the
training set, as it is the k-nearest neighbor algorithm;
i.e. k-nn has to compute the distance from the sample
to be predicted and all training data at each prediction.
Second, as GIST extracts features based on the global
structure of an image if an adversary knows the tech-
nique it could avoid detection by reallocating different
parts of the code. On the contrary, our approach is re-
silient to this technique because convolutional networks
extract local and invariant features from an image and
thus, it would be able to find the patterns indepen-
dently of their position.
5.3 Microsoft Malware Classification Challenge
Microsoft provided a dataset composed of 21741 sam-
ples for the Big Data Innovators Gathering (BIG 2015)
Anti-Malware Prediction Challenge, 10868 for training
and 10873 for testing. Every program in the dataset
has a file containing the hexadecimal representation of
the malware’s binary content and its corresponding as-
sembly file. However, only the label for the samples
belonging to the training dataset is provided. Table 5
shows the distribution of malware programs present in
the training dataset.
Table 5: BIG 2015: Distribution of Samples
Family Class ID #samples
Ramnit 1 1541
Lollipop 2 2478
Kelihos ver3 3 2942
Vundo 4 475
Simda 5 42
Tracur 6 751
Kelihos ver1 7 398
Obfuscator.ACY 8 1228
Gatak 9 1013
5.3.1 Results
Similar to the MalImg dataset, we downsampled the
gray scale images. In particular, images of the BIG
dataset were downsampled to 128x128 pixels because
greater width and height did not improve the perfor-
mance of the classifier. In addition, we performed 5-fold
and 10-fold cross validation to evaluate our model. Ta-
ble 6 and Table 7 show the confusion matrices obtained
for 5-fold cross validation and 10-fold cross validation.
Table 6: BIG 2015 dataset confusion matrix for 5-fold
validation using images of 128x128 pixels
Family 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Accuracy
1 1492 7 0 2 2 11 3 19 5 0.968
2 6 2424 0 1 3 10 0 3 31 0.978
3 1 0 2937 0 0 0 4 0 0 0.998
4 2 1 2 461 2 2 1 2 2 0.971
5 3 3 0 4 25 1 0 6 0 0.595
6 10 5 1 3 1 701 1 18 11 0.933
7 2 0 1 0 0 0 392 0 3 0.985
8 36 4 1 13 2 19 5 1144 4 0.932
9 2 6 0 1 0 2 2 2 998 0.985
Table 7: BIG 2015 dataset confusion matrix for 10-fold
validation using images of 128x128 pixels
Family 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Accuracy
1 1490 4 2 2 2 9 1 28 3 0.967
2 6 2440 0 0 1 7 0 8 16 0.985
3 0 1 2938 1 0 0 2 0 0 0.999
4 3 0 2 461 2 1 1 3 2 0.971
5 3 2 0 1 29 2 0 5 0 0.690
6 8 6 1 2 0 713 2 10 9 0.948
7 1 0 5 1 0 0 391 0 0 0.982
8 44 4 2 8 2 17 5 1138 8 0.923
9 2 2 0 0 0 6 2 5 996 0.983
Table 8: Performance comparison of various methods
for classification of BIG 2015 training dataset. 1-nearest
neighbor (1-NN). Support vector machines (SVM).
Static feed-forward network (SFN1 & SFN2). Dynamic
feed-forward network (DFN)
Method 5-fold accuracy
Macro-averaged
F1 Score
Haralick features + XGBoost 0.955 -
LBP features + XGBoost 0.951 -
CNN 0.973 0.927
10-fold accuracy
12 PCA features + 1-NN 0.966 0.910
10 PCA features + SVM 0.946 0.864
52 PCA features + SFN1 0.956 0.884
52 PCA features + SFN2 0.942 0.849
52 PCA features + DFN 0.955 0.889
CNN 0.975 0.940
Table 8 presents the results obtained by state-of-
the-art approaches in the literature that had extracted
image-based features to classify malware from the BIG
dataset. To sum up, Narayanan et al. [18] used PCA
to extract the first 10, 12 and 52 principal components
and classify malware using different machine learning
classification algorithms. Moreover, Ahmadi et al. [1]
extracted Haralick and local binary pattern features
from images and trained an ensemble of trees for classi-
fication. Their approaches were evaluated using 5-fold
and 10-fold cross validation, respectively. As can be ob-
served, our method outperformed the rest of approaches
in the literature, achieving 0.973 and 0.975 accuracy,
for 5-fold and 10-fold cross validation, respectively. Fur-
thermore, the average classification time of our approach
is 0,001 seconds. Fig. 6 shows the computational time
of every feature extraction method evaluated. The im-
provement of our method is equal to 99.98%, 98.47%
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Fig. 6: The required time of feature extraction from the grayscale representation for each program. The time in
brackets shows the total time of extraction for all training samples. LBP stands for local binary patterns. IMG
denotes how much time it takes to transform a binary executable into a gray-scale image. PCA 10, PCA 12 and
PCA 52 refer to the number of principal components used. CNN A refers to the time needed to extract the features
by the convolutional network and CNN B refers to the time the networks needs to extract features and classify a
sample.
and 96.06% with respect to the computational time
needed to extract GIST, Haralick and local binary pat-
tern features. Additionally, our method is 67.35%, 68.29%
and 83.13% faster than the calculation of the 10, 12 and
52 principal components.
6 Conclusions
This paper presents a novel file agnostic deep learn-
ing system for classification of malware based on its
visualization as gray-scale images. As far as we know,
it is the first approach to apply deep learning to find
patterns from malware’s binary content represented as
images. The proposed solution has a number of advan-
tages that allow malicious programs to be detected in a
real-time environment. Firstly, it is file agnostic and is
based solely on the binary code of an executable. Sec-
ondly, the transformation of an executable into a gray-
scale image is inexpensive. Thirdly, the prediction time
is minimal. Fourthly, it obtained greater classification
accuracy than all previous methods in the literature
that were based on the representation of malware as
gray-scale images.
6.1 Limitations and Future Work
Despite the fact that our approach was able to outper-
form state-of-the-art methods in terms of accuracy and
classification time, it has some issues that are directly
related to the visualization of malware as grayscale im-
ages. Even though it can be seen that the visualiza-
tion of malware programs belonging to the same family
has similar patterns, this approach has problems with
some samples that have been compressed or encrypted,
which may have a completely different overall structure.
For instance, the visualization of samples from the Au-
torun.K and Yuner.A families are almost equal. To deal
with such cases, we suggest combining the features ex-
tracted by the convolutional neural network with hand-
designed features as input of a machine learning model
based on distinct types of file features [1].
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